During the night of February 21st, Moscow Time, after months of force buildup, Vladimir Putin finally made his move: recognize the breakaway “Donetsk” and “Luhansk” People Republics. In the preceding speech, he listed historical grievances Russia had with the loss of Ukraine, NATO, as well as various issues Ukraine has faced since independence, especially towards its Russian minority. For now at least, the most catastrophic possibility, that of a full-on Russian invasion of Ukraine, has yet to happen and may have been averted. Other than that, it may be that the world has settled on the dumbest possible compromise resolution to this crisis, a resolution that will certainly not stand the test of time.
The current crisis likely was sparked when Ukraine demonstrated late last year the possibility of their operational usage of Turkish Bayraktar drones, which proved devastatingly effective in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, and could tip the balance of power, leading to fears in Russia that Ukraine could reabsorb “Donetsk” and “Luhansk”. Then Russia deployed a show of force on its border with Ukraine, deterring Ukraine from contemplating any action that could alter the pro-Russia status quo, while demanding lasting re-assurances from the NATO on the broader issues with the post-Cold War peace, namely NATO’s eastwards expansion, contrary to assurances they perceived the West had delivered to the then USSR. This buildup of over 100,000 troops was perceived as a threat that, should Russia not be satisfied, an invasion of Ukraine would be in order.
In my view, a full on invasion remains unlikely, as it would completely destroy Russia’s internationally image, being an act no country can tolerate, and would signal its complete isolation from the international community and economy. NATO would certainly start to significantly scale up military deployments in Eastern Europe, possibly including deploying nuclear weapons, meaning the Cold War starts again but now much closer to Russia’s doorsteps. Ukraine itself would be a mess to pacify for years to come, draining an already weak Russia economy, which would be further hobbled by inability to export natural resources West. An actual invasion of Ukraine would be a disaster for Russia, to such an extent that even a threat of full-on invasion would not be credible.
However, a recognition of “Donetsk” and “Luhansk” carries similar costs, just on a smaller scale, and with negligible practical benefit for Russia, other than maintenance of a toehold in Ukraine. Politically, this does give everyone an out: Russia can claim “victory” through the confrontation, the US can claim they were right to point out Russian aggression, and Ukraine still exists. However, realistically only the US state establishment wins. Ukraine’s situation remains far from ideal. Russia suffered significant costs: the financial cost of keeping troops in forward positions, plus reputational damage by the West painting Russia as an aggressive rogue state, potential complete cancelling of Nord-Stream 2, other sanction, and criticism even from Russia’s allies, simply to do what ultimately amounts to little more than preserving the status quo. Meanwhile, the US can engage in an I-told-you-so world tour, while nascent internal anti-NATO skeptics are now forced to set down the Iraq War weapons of mass destruction comparisons; this was a political victory for “boots in Europe”, “the deep state” and NATO, and a setback for isolationism, “don’t trust the CIA” and “NATO is braindead”. It is quite curious that, just as the US was about to fully discredit itself with updating predictions of imminent invasion, Putin has now acted to partially prove their overall message right, even if the specifics are off. Perhaps this was the compromise that had ultimately been agreed to: Russia gives the US a political “win” (although not for Biden personally: he will be attacked by the GOP for “being weak”, despite the GOP’s own incoherent stance), while the US lets Russia de facto expand slightly and have something to show for their efforts. If so, this would seem to be an agreement lopsidedly in the US’ favor, but given Russia’s weak hand, it may be their only way out. Even if there is a de-escalation after this, it would only be temporary, as neither Russia nor NATO’s fundamental concerns have been addressed, and in fact will likely worsen with the fallout from “Donetsk” and “Luhansk” “independence”. NATO remains on Russia’s doorstep, and cannot on fundamental ideological grounds either abandon their Eastern allies or specifically bar Ukraine from joining. Russia asking for a rollback of NATO would mostly entail concessions that would be political suicide for leaders of the West to give, other than perhaps the withdrawal of a few “offensive” missiles here and there. However, given that Russia has the highest number of nuclear warheads in the world, as well as recently developed delivery systems designed to evade anti-missile technology, Russia should not actually need to worry about a NATO invasion.
From the perspective of the West, Russia has still shown itself to be willing to disregard international norms and unilaterally redraw international borders, a continuation of similar previous acts in Georgia and Crimea (which also coincided with the Olympic Games). From Russia’s view, this was in reaction to the “Kosovo independence precedent”, which established that under certain “exceptional” circumstances, a region may unilaterally declare independence, and that what constituted “exceptional” had been defined based on Western values. As such, it was only fair, in Russia’s view, that they can do the same thing where it suited them, based on whatever values they hold as convenient. I agree that the widespread recognition of Kosovo’s unilateral independence, while not a violation of international law, was done with relatively little introspection on the part of many countries of the problematic political precedent it did set. However, two wrongs does not make a right. Russia’s actions, regardless of whether they may be viewed as a proportionate application of the “Kosovo precedent”, certainly does not set the world towards a better course, and would further erode international norms. It is the geopolitical equivalent of throwing a hissy fit, demanding that the West right “wrongs” that cannot be righted (NATO cannot plausibly be “unexpanded”), reverse what had already happened (Kosovo’s independence cannot plausibly be “undeclared”), and be solely responsible for providing answers to problems that, regardless of their origin, are now being exacerbated by Russia itself.
Hopefully, the past two decades can spark a rethinking of what principles and international norms should be held sacrosanct, and how to defend them through the rough-and-tumble of geopolitics. It is clear that there is fundamental disagreement regarding what are the most important international norms and principles, while even theoretically agreed to norms are readily violated or redefined when convenient. It is crucial that, in this exercise at least, the entire world can approach with no ideological prejudice, discuss in good faith, and rescue the floundering world order.